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Summary: Regulating Robo Advice Across the Financial Services Industry
Summary

In general, a robo advisor can be defined as an automated service that ranks, or matches, consumers to
financial products on a personalized basis, sometimes in addition to providing related services such as
educating consumers and selling products to them. Often associated with web-based financial investment
services, a robo advisor can also include consumer financial product intermediaries such as automated
mortgage brokers and insurance exchanges, as well as lead generation services such as Zillow, NerdWallet, and
Mint.com. Although investment-focused robo advisors have received the most scrutiny from regulators, the
same promises and regulatory concerns raised by investment robo advisors apply to their insurance and
banking counterparts. The benefit of defining robo advisors as a general category of tools that span different
financial services sectors is that an inclusive approach will encourage more cross-sharing and collaborative
thinking to tackle similar challenges and opportunities, including regulatory questions.
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Summary: Regulating Robo Advice Across the
Financial Services Industry
Seminar by Professor Tom Baker
In general, a robo advisor can be defined as an automated service that ranks, or matches, consumers
to financial products on a personalized basis, sometimes in addition to providing related services such
as educating consumers and selling products to them. Often associated with web-based financial
investment services, a robo advisor can also include consumer financial product intermediaries such as
automated mortgage brokers and insurance exchanges, as well as lead generation services such as Zillow,
NerdWallet, and Mint.com. Although investment-focused robo advisors have received the most scrutiny
from regulators, the same promises and regulatory concerns raised by investment robo advisors apply to
their insurance and banking counterparts. The benefit of defining robo advisors as a general category of
tools that span different financial services sectors is that an inclusive approach will encourage more crosssharing and collaborative thinking to tackle similar challenges and opportunities, including regulatory
questions.
Regardless of the specific financial service, there are four core components of robo advisors that require distinct capabilities to assess.
Each of these components has their own regulatory concern.

CORE COMPONENT OF
ROBO ADVISING

REGULATORY CONCERN

Algorithms and models

Bias, competence, fairness

ALGORITHMS AND MODELS

Data

Access, quality

The main regulatory concerns with algorithms and models are
controlling inherent bias as well as guaranteeing a certain level of
competency. The programmer who wrote the algorithm may know
a lot about code, but how much do they know about insurance (or
other financial products)?
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Any biases the programmer or designer may have, conscious or
unconscious, could be baked into the code or model. If the algorithm and model pass the bias and competency tests, there is
an additional concern about fairness. Is the algorithm and model
somehow classifying the customer from an unfair vantage point
that is perhaps a reflection of a structural inequality inherent in the
historical data?

DATA

Just as there are regulatory concerns about algorithms, there are
questions about data—not only in ensuring the quality of the data,
but also taking a proactive role in making data available. One key
factor that determines what type of robo advisors is developed
is the ease by which certain types of data can be obtained. For
example, data surrounding publicly traded securities are easily
accessible, however, in the cases of mortgages, credit cards, and
private insurance, this is not so. Without access to reliable data,
certain parts of the financial sector will be unable to benefit from
the automated function of robo advice.
The Open Banking or Open API Initiative, which is making progress
in Europe, is one example of government acting to make data available to facilitate a private market in tools. The regulatory concerns
about data are about access: has the company obtained access
to reasonable sources of data and are there any concerns that an inability to obtain data will lead to bias; where there are gaps in data,
what are the strategies that the robo advisor considered to address
the gaps; does the regulator have the authority to increase access
to data and thereby improve the quality of the robo advice?

“I have a mantra about data.
The less you’ve worked with data,
the better you think data are.”

Case Example: Choice Architecture
Behavioral economics research by Eric Johnson, Peter Ubel,
and David Comerford, studied how preconceived associations can alter people’s perceptions of insurance plans.
Using the North Carolina Health Exchange as a model, the
researchers asked a sample of participants which category
of plans they would look at first if they were shopping for
health insurance. To half the people they described the
gold plans as having higher monthly premiums and lower
out-of-pocket costs. For the other half, they switched the
gold and bronze plans, describing the gold plans as having
lower monthly premiums and higher out-of-pocket costs.
Although the labels were arbitrary and shouldn’t impact
people’s choices, the majority said they preferred gold plans
over bronze plans, regardless of which plan was labeled as
gold.
Healthcare.gov 3.0 — Behavioral Economics and Insurance Exchanges
Peter A. Ubel, M.D., David A. Comerford, Ph.D., and Eric Johnson, Ph.D.
N Engl J Med 2015; 372:695-698February 19, 2015DOI: 10.1056/NEJMp1414771

CHOICE ARCHITECTURE

In looking at choice architecture—the organization of the context
in which people make decisions—the regulatory concern is with
biases in how information is presented to the consumer and how
the design of the interface can impact decision making. Regulators
need to review and confirm that the company has done rigorous
experimental testing in order to assess whether the robo advisors
reflect a meaningful and empirically informed choice architecture
effort. This testing and verification is more difficult in the context
of hybrid robo advisors, in which customers interact with a person
who operates the robo advisor behind the scenes.

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY INFRASTRUCTURE

Because robo advisors rely on access to financial, health, banking,
and other private data, IT security is paramount. Financial services
regulators already appear to recognize the need to enhance their
capacities in this area.

CONCLUSION

Robo advising technology is in a nascent stage of development
and researchers are just beginning to understand the potential
implications of how automated services will change the financial
industry. As these automated services proliferate, regulators will
need to take a more active role in assessing minimum competence,
protecting consumers, and ensuring robo advising companies
have access to high quality data. But what is the proper role
for government in monitoring the quality of robo advice? For
instance, should there be a minimum competence and honesty
standard for robo advisors, the equivalent of a broker’s license, or
registered investment advisor license and insurance agent license?
Furthermore, what is the role of government in making data
available to facilitate entrepreneurship in the development of a wide
range of robo advice tools? While regulators of course need to be
vigilant, it is also important they not over-react to the deployment
of robo advisors.
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